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CHAPTER 2 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.1. Wills: Parol evidence: Reformation. It is axiomatic that 
wills cannot be reformed) Unless the dispositive desires of a testator are 
set forth in a duly executed written instrument, they will not be given 
effect despite clear and convincing proof as to what they are. In limited 
circumstances, mistaken expressions, such as those amounting to a mis-
take in the factum, may be excised and the remaining provisions may 
be given effect.2 Ambiguous and inaccurate terms may be made certain 
by resort to extrinsic evidence. Such parol evidence is, however, ad-
missible only as an aid in construing the language already present and 
may not be introduced to alter the clear meaning or legal effect of the 
words used.s 
In Hyatt v. Jurczyk4 inconsistent provisions of a will were permitted 
to stand as written even though there was parol evidence to show a mis-
take in the description of one of the devises. The testatrix owned two 
pieces of real estate in the city of Pittsfield. One was a lot located on 
Housatonic Street and recorded in Berkshire Deeds, Book 525, page 
423; the other, consisting of four lots, was located on Green Street 
and recorded in Berkshire Deeds, Book 557, page 145. Item One of 
the will provided: "I give and devise in fee simple to my son, Merritt 
... the following real property which is located in Pittsfield, County 
of Berkshire, Massachusetts, and recorded on July 11, 1949, in Deed 
Book 557, Page 145 .... " Item Five provided: "I give, bequeath, and 
devise in fee simple to my son, Arthur ... four (4) lots located on 
Green Street, Pittsfield, Massachusetts .... " The testatrix's daughter 
was the residuary devisee. By the language of the devises, the testatrix 
had left the four lots on Green Street to both Merritt and Arthur. The 
Housatonic Street property would pass to the daughter as residuary 
devisee. 
The testatrix's son, Merritt, brought an action in the United States 
District Court against his sister, the sole defendant, for a declaratory 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts .Bar. 
§2.l. 1 Mahoney v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 191, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (1933); Polsey 
v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450, 454, 85 N.E. 574, 575 (1908). 
2 See Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills §58 (2d ed. 1953). 
8 Keith v. Worcester County Trust Co., 338 Mass. 41, 43, 153 N.E.2d 630, 631 
(1958); Mahoney v. Grainger, 283 Mass. 189, 192. 186 N.E. 86, 87 (1933). 
4368 F.2d 546 (lst Cir. 1966). 
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judgment that he was the lawful owner of the Housatonic Street prop-
erty. The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence which showed a 
declared intention of the testatrix to leave the plaintiff the Housatonic 
Street property and that she made a mistake in supplying the lawyer 
who drafted the will with an erroneous registry reference.5 The lower 
court refused to admit this evidence, ruling it to be inadmissible parol 
evidence, and dismissed the complaint. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, find-
ing that the will contained totally repugnant provisions and that under 
Massachusetts law the latter devise is deemed to be the "final determi-
nation" of the testatrix.6 This result left the plaintiff as the only 
member of the family who was disinherited. This fact together with 
the inconsistent devises, and the circumstance that the testatrix owned 
two parcels of land in Pittsfield, would seem to indicate that some 
mistake was made in the dispositive scheme as expressed by the will. 
This mistake would appear to be obvious without any reliance on testi-
mony as to the declared intent of the testatrix or the mistaken title 
reference given to the draftsman. The fact of an apparent mistake, 
however, was not sufficient to give the plaintiff the remedy he sought. 
Even if the court took cognizance of the mistake, in order for the 
plaintiff to acquire the Housatonic Street land, the court would have 
had to create a totally new provision. A construction of the language 
of the will would not have been sufficient. Since the creation of a new 
provision would be reformation of the will and not construction,7 the 
plaintiff was without a remedy. 
§2.2. Trust for the benefit of creditors: Rule against Perpetuities. 
Although some commentators advocate that the Rule against Perpetu-
ities should be restricted to gratuitous transfers of property,l commer-
cial transactions have not been immunized from the Rule. Thus, op-
tions to purchase which might be exercised, and leasehold estates 
which might commence, at some time beyond the permissible period 
of the Rule have been invalidated.2 
In Childs v. Sherman3 the Rule against Perpetuities was invoked in 
5Id. at 547. 
6 Dawes v. Swan, 4 Mass. 208, 215 (1808). See Fruh v. Fruh, 316 Mass. 590, 593. 
55 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1944); Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312. 316, 41 N.E.2d 21, 23 
(1942). 
7 See Taylor v. Albree, 309 Mass. 248, 34 N.E.2d 601 (1941). 
§2.2. 1 E.g., Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity. Judicial and Statutory Correc-
tives, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1318. 1321-1322 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: 
Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 736-739 (1952); Simes 
and Smith, The Law of Future Interests §1244 (2d ed. 1956). 
2 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 
(1920) (option in gross exceeding the period of perpetuities); Haggerty v. City of 
Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (a lease for 
years to commence upon the completion of a building under construction); contra, 
Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817 (1963); Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 
295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
3351 Mass. 450, 221 N.E.2d 748 (1966). 
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an attempt to strike down a trust settlement created by an insolvent 
trustor for the benefit of creditors. Under the terms of the trust, the 
creditors had to assent to the arrangement to become trust beneficiaries. 
It was argued that the trust agreement was violative of the Rule, since 
a creditor might delay filing his assent indefinitely and thereby post-
pone the vesting of the interest of the creditors as a class for a period 
beyond that of the Rule. If class membership is not fully ascertained 
within the allowable period, the entire class gift fails.4 
Relying upon a recent California case,5 the Supreme Judicial Court 
made it clear that it was not disposed to apply the Rule in a "rigid" 
or "remorseless" manner to common business transactions. The Court 
interpreted the trust agreement to require that any creditor wishing 
to avail himself of the trust provisions should file his assent within a 
reasonable time of the creation of the trust. Thus, the court found no 
violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. Such a reasonable time, un-
der the circumstances of the case, could not exceed twenty-one years. 
The decision gives due recognition to both modern-day economic 
conditions and the objectives of the Rule. The transaction, which was 
essentially a business agreement to satisfy claims of an insolvent debtor, 
was not designed to take wealth out of circulation, but rather to man-
age it and to distribute it in satisfaction of claims as soon as convenient. 
The parties to the trust agreement obviously did not anticipate that 
the fulfillment of the objectives might be postponed for as long as 
twenty-one years. Unlike donative transfers, where the Rule's concern 
with possibilities may be relevant, the actual expectations of the parties 
are the essence of commercial transactions. 
§2.3. Trusts: Duty to account. The beneficial interests of a trust 
may be subject to modification or termination. The trustor may re-
serve the power to revoke or modify the trust. He may create powers 
of appointment in himself and in others, including the trustee. The 
charter of management given the trustee may be greatly restricted or 
enlarged and the general duties imposed upon a trustee may be modi-
fied substantially. Yet, there must be some restrictions on the amount 
of unsupervised control that may be given a trustee. If the powers of 
disposition granted to a person designated a trustee are so unrestricted 
4 Simes and Smith, note 1 supra, at §1265. 
5 In Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817 (1963), the Supreme Court of 
California held that a lease to commence upon the filing of a notice of the com-
pletion of a building did not violate the Rule against Perpetuities: "Certainly our 
function is not to interpret the rule so as to create commercial anomalies. . . • 
[T]he parties to .•• [common business arrangements] do not suspect that the rule 
will be extended to invalidate their agreements; even the attorneys • . • may 
excusably not anticipate such application. Surely the courts do not seek to invalidate 
bona fide transactions by the imported application of esoteric legalisms. Our task 
is not to block the business pathway but to clear it, defining it by guideposts that 
are reasonably to be expected .... We therefore do not propose to apply the rule 
in the rigid or remorseless manner . . . ; instead we shall seek to interpret it, 
reasonably, in the light of its objectives and the economic conditions of modern 
society." Id. at 533-534, 386 P.2d at 823. 
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as to make it clear that he is not to be subject to enforceable duties to 
deal with the property for the benefit of others, then no trust is 
created, but rather a beneficial title is conveyed.1 
One of the general duties imposed on all trustees is the duty to 
account. How far a trust instrument may go in modifying this duty 
may be the subject of some speculation.2 In Briggs v. Crowley,3 how-
ever, the Supreme Judicial Court held that trust provisions relieving 
the trustees of the duty to account are against public policy insofar 
as they purport to deprive the Probate Court of jurisdiction to enter-
tain a petition for accounting or to grant other equitable relief. 
In Briggs, the trust instrument provided that the trustees "shall not 
be called upon to account to anyone ... except to the donor" and that 
the "discretion of the trustees hereunder shall not be questioned." After 
observing that such clauses indicate that the donor intended to make 
a beneficial gift and not to impose a trust obligation on the transferee,4 
the Court, considering the entire instrument, was satisfied that the 
donor did intend to create a trust and not to make a gift. 
The principal case should not be construed to mean that the settlor 
of an inter vivos trust may not modify the trustee's common law duty 
to account to all persons who have or may have beneficial interests in 
a trust. The trustor has a legitimate concern in the reduction of the 
cost of administration and the promotion of administrative efficiency. 
A simplified mode of accounting with some binding effect on all bene-
ficiaries of the trust may be a desirable objective. It is common to find 
inter vivos trust instruments providing for a trustee's annual account-
ing to the grantor during his lifetime and after his death to the income 
beneficiaries who are, for the time being, receiving income. Such in-
struments often contain the proviso that an approval of these accounts 
by the grantor or the income beneficiaries shall be binding with re-
spect to all items of income or principal stated in the account and upon 
all persons who are beneficiaries of the trust, including contingent, un-
known and unascertained remaindermen.5 
Such terms may raise the question whether the trustee and bene-
ficiaries to whom the trustee must account may be considered to have 
the power to shift beneficial interests of the trust. The grantor may 
in express terms grant to the trustee or any beneficiary a power of 
appointment without defeating the trust. However, the administrative 
provision for a binding effect on all beneficiaries by the approval of an 
§2.3. 12 Scott, Trusts §172 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §172. 
Comment d (1957). 
2 See Stephenson, Drafting Wills and Trust Agreements - Administrative Pro-
visions §10.15 (1952). 
31967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 445, 224 N.E.2d 417. 
4 See Scott, note 1 supra. 
5 See Casner, Estate Planning 1209-1210, 1236, 1259 (3d ed. 1961); Stephenson, 
note 2 supra; Old Colony Trust Co., Massachusetts Trust and Will Manual 
§XVII-IO (1967). Testamentary trust accounting requirements are set forth in G.L., 
c.206. 
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account by some should not be deemed to include a power to shift 
beneficial interests.6 The trustee still should be subject to his fiduciary 
obligations to carry out the terms of the trust and should be required 
to make a proper disclosure of his conduct in his accounting. The per-
son approving the account would be required to act in good faith.7 
The grantor of the trust in Briggs v. Crowley intended to create a 
trust and thereby impose equitable duties upon the trustees. The pro-
visions making the trustees unaccountable to anybody after the grantor 
died were inconsistent with the objective to create a trust. No such 
inconsistency appears where a trustee is under an obligation to at 
least account to an income beneficiary, even though an approval of the 
account will be binding on all beneficiaries of the trust.s 
§2.4. Trusts: Trustee's power to allocate receipts and disburse-
ments. A trust provision granting the trustee the power to allocate 
receipts and disbursements to income or principal may have several 
possible objectives: to relieve the trustee of liability for failure to apply 
the established rules of trust accounting;l to avoid the expense of liti-
gation where the law is unsettled or the application of the law is doubt-
ful;2 to simplify trust administration where the law may be well es-
tablished but difficult or impractical to administer;3 to neutralize the 
unfairness that might result from the application of established rules;4 
or to give the trustee the power to determine to some degree the bene-
ficial interests to be enjoyed by the life tenant and the remainderman.5 
The scope of such a power was clarified during the 1967 SURVEY 
year in the case of Old Colony Trust Company v. Silliman.6 In Silli-
man, a testamentary trust provided for income payments to be made 
to various individuals with gifts over for charitable purposes. Among 
the administrative powers given the trustee was one providing: "My 
said trustee may decide whether accretions to the trust property shall 
be treated as principal or income and whether expenses shall be 
charged to principal or income." Instructions as to the extent of the 
6 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Silliman, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, also discussed 
in §2.4 infra. 
7 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §172, Comment d. 
S For a comprehensive treatment of nonjudicial settlement of accounts, see West-
fall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1957). 
§2.4. 10ld Colony Trust Co. v. Silliman, 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, 235, 223 
N.E.2d 504, 507. 
2Id.; American Security and Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1940), 
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941). 
3 See 3 Scott, Trusts §236.3 (2d ed. 1956). 
4 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Aymar, 317 Mass. 66, 56 N.E.2d 889 (1944); D'Ooge v. 
Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, 560-561, 57 N.E. 1025, 1026 (1900); G.L., c. 203, §21A, noted 
in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.8. 
5 See Note, Discretionary Income and Principal Clauses in Trust Instruments, 50 
Yale L.J. 1467 (1941); Report of the Subcommittee on Trustees' Absolute and Un-
controlled Discretionary Powers, Proceedings of the American Bar Association Sec-
tion of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, August 9-11, 1965, 185, 189-190; 3 
Scott, note 3 supra, at §233.5; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §816 (2d ed. 1962). 
61967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, 223 N.E.2d 504_ 
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power were sought in order to aid the executors in determining 
whether to bring suit against the United States for the recovery of 
estate taxes paid as a result of a denial of a charitable deduction.7 The 
Internal Revenue Service took the position that the deduction could 
not be allowed because the power to decide whether accretions and 
expenses were to be allocated to income or principal precluded the 
present ascertainment of the values of the charitable remainders.s 
The Court decreed that the trustee's power could not be exercised 
in such a way as to shift the beneficial interests of the private bene-
ficiaries and the charitable remainders and that, therefore, the values 
of the remainders were presently ascertainable. The Court construed 
the trustee's power as follows: 
We think the grant of power to "decide whether accretions" are 
to be treated as principal or income and how expenses are to be 
charged, apart from its possible exculpatory effect, is primarily 
an administrative power authorizing the trustee in instances of 
doubt to use its best informed judgment in good faith in the light 
of what the established rules suggest to the trustee is consistent 
therewith. This is a means of avoiding the expense of litigation. 
This power may not be used to shift beneficial interests .... 9 
The authority of Dumaine v. DumainelO and State Street Trust Com-
pany v. United States11 appears to have been seriously affected by the 
Silliman case. In the former case, the trustee, also one of the two life 
beneficiaries, was given the "full power and discretion to determine 
whether any money or other property received by him is principal or 
income without being answerable to any person for the manner in 
which he shall exercise his discretion." This power was considered to 
be an important factor by the Supreme Judical Court in upholding 
the trustee's right to depart from the ordinary and well settled rules 
of trust accounting by allocating capital gains resulting from a sale of 
trust property to income. In a reference to the Dumaine case, the Court 
in Silliman observed that despite the expression of administrative 
powers in very broad terms, such powers have to be exercised with a 
reasonable regard for usual fiduciary principles - meaning that estab-
lished rules must be applied.12 
7 On the issue of jurisdiction to entertain such a petition for instructions, see 
Watson v. Goldthwaite, 345 Mass. 29, 31, 35, 184 N.E.2d 340, 341, 343 (1962); Second 
Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State Street Trust Co., 335 Mass. 407, 
409, 140 N.E.2d 201, 204 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Survey Mass. Law §12.7. As to the 
effect of the state court decision in the federal courts, see Blair v. Commissioner, 
300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 44 (1934); Commerce Oil 
Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1962). 
S See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2055; Treas. Reg. §20.2055-2(a) (1954). 
91967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 235, 223 N.E.2d at 507. 
10301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (1938). 
11 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). 
121967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 234, 223 N.E.2d at 507. 
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In State Street Trust Company, the Court of Appeals, in applying 
Massachusetts law, held that the grant of broad administrative powers 
could enable trustees to shift economic benefits among beneficiaries.13 
One of these powers was 
to determine what shall be charged or credited to income and 
what to principal notwithstanding any determination by the 
courts and specifically, but without limitation, to make such de-
termination in regard to stock and cash dividends, rights, and all 
other receipts in respect of the ownership of stock and to decide 
whether or not to make deductions from income for deprecia-
tion, amortization or waste and in what amount .... 14 
In finding no external standard by which a court could measure the 
trustees' conduct, the court in State Street Trust Company noted that 
the trustees' discretion to allocate assets to corpus or income was not 
limited to situations of honest doubt of classification and where the 
law is unsettled. It was, however, the dissenting view of Chief Judge 
Magruder which received approbation in a recent Supreme Judicial 
Court decision by way of dictum15 and was adhered to in the Silliman 
case.16 Judge Magruder could not "accept the premise that a Massa-
chusetts court of equity would consider itself impotent to supervise the 
administration of these trusts so as to control any attempt to shift the 
incidence of their enjoyment."17 
Silliman, Dumaine and State Street Trust Company each involved 
trusts which created life estates with remainders over, manifesting the 
donor's desire to create successive beneficial interests. No express 
powers of appointment were granted to shift these beneficial interests. 
To construe administrative powers, although expressed in the language 
13 "Perhaps no single power conferred by the decedent on the trustees would be 
enough to warrant the inclusion of the corpora of the trusts in his estate. But we 
believe that the powers conferred on the trustees, considered as a whole, are so 
broad and all inclusive that within any limits a Massachusetts court of equity could 
rationally impose, the trustees, within the scope of their discretionary powers, 
could very substantially shift the economic benefits of the trusts between the life 
tenants and the remainderman." 263 F.2d at 639. 
14 263 F.2d at 63B. 
15 "As Chief Judge Magruder indicated ..• in his dissent in State St. Trust Co. 
v. United States ... a Massachusetts court of equity will 'supervise the administra-
tion of ... trusts so as to control any attempt to shift the incidence of their en-
joyment.' Even broadly expressed administrative and management powers ... 'are 
limited by standards which the Massachusetts court of equity could and would 
apply to supervise effectively •.• [proper trust] administration.' We disagree with 
any suggestion to the contrary in the majority opinion in that case, which unduly 
relies upon somewhat general language in Dumaine v. Dumaine .••. A fair 
reading of the whole of most trust instruments will reveal a 'judicially enforceable, 
external, and ascertainable standard' for the exercise of even broadly expressed 
fiduciary powers." Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Stone, 34B Mass. 345, 351 
n.B, 203 N.E.2d 547, 552 n.B (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.3. 
161967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233-234, 223 N.E.2d at 506. 
17 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 641 (1st Cir. 1959). 
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of broad discretion, to include powers to change substantially the 
amount to be received by the income and corpus beneficiaries would 
appear to conflict with the dispositive provisions of the trusts.1S 
1S See 3 Scott, note 3 supra, §233.5. 
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